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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. LeVASSEUR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920444-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended. 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the appellant was entrapped to commit the 
offense for which he was convicted. The standard of review is 
that if reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence of entrap-
ment should necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the Appel-
lant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. State v. Kourbelas, 
621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980). 
2. Whether Rule 608(b) of the Rules of Evidence pro-
hibits the testimony of a witness that an undercover police officer 
used illegal drugs during the time she was investigating Appellant, 
where the officer had testified on cross-examination that she did 
not use illegal drugs during that time. The standard of review is 
whether the trial court's ruling excluding this evidence con-
stituted error affecting a substantial right of Appellant. Utah 
Rule of Evidence 103(a); State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 
1990) n.l at 821. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. I, §7: No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, §12: In criminal pro-
secutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by coun-
sel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy there-
of, to testify in his own behalf, to be con-
fronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district in which the of-
fense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases . . . . 
STATUTES 
§76-2-303(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953): It 
is a defense that the actor was entrapped into 
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs 
when a law enforcement officer or a person di-
rected by or acting in cooperation with the 
officer induces the commission of an offense 
in order to obtain evidence of the commission 
for prosecution by methods creating a sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be com-
mitted by one not otherwise ready to commit 
it. Conduct merely affording a person an op-
portunity to commit an offense does not con-
stitute entrapment. 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 608 (b): Specific 
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting his credi-
bility, other than conviction of a crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by ex-
trinsic evidence. . • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction based 
on a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of one count of dis-
tribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in 
violation of §58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 
Appellant was charged with two counts of distributing 
cocaine. At a pretrial hearing on Appellant's assertion of the 
defense of entrapment, the trial judge ruled that, as a matter of 
law, Appellant was not entrapped into commission of the offenses 
(R. 45). The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict 
of guilty as to one count; the jury was hung as to the other count, 
as to which a mistrial was declared (R. 76, T. 203). Appellant 
was initially committed to the Department of Corrections for a 
diagnostic evaluation (R. 115), and was thereafter sentenced to 
the statutory prison term. Appellant was placed on probation on 
conditions including hospitalization, jail sentence and fine (R. 
126). This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
I. The Police Conduct 
In the month of November of 1990, Anne Burchett, an 
undercover police officer working for the Iron/Beaver County Nar-
cotics Task Force, met the Appellant Mike LeVasseur when she went 
into the bar where he worked in Cedar City (T. 62) . Agent Bur-
chett's purpose in going into the bar was to befriend people in 
order to obtain drugs from them, either through purchase or gift 
(T. 81). Although she had no conversation with Mike during this 
first visit, she returned to the bar in May, 1991, and, by this 
time, Mike had been identified to her as a drug "target" (T. 88). 
She thus went into the bar this second time with a specific pur-
pose to try to get drugs or information from the Appellant (T. 88). 
At this second meeting the two struck up a conversation, and made 
a date for dinner together at a local restaurant on May 8 or 9 
(T. 63, 89). This dinner together was the beginning of an ex-
clusive dating arrangement between the officer and the Appellant 
(T. 100, 163) . 
In the weeks following the dinner date, agent Burchett 
began visiting Mike at the bar two or three times a week (T. 155). 
They went for a motorcycle ride together, to a movie and to lunch 
(T. 63), and, some time prior to May 24, 1991, they went together 
to a party at a friend's cabin at Panguitch Lake. After drinking 
and playing strip poker until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., Agent Burchett 
and Appellant retired alone to a downstairs bedroom, where they 
spent the night together (T. 64). Although they kissed during this 
evening, and although agent Burchett and Appellant slept together 
in the same bed, they did not have sexual intercourse. Agent 
Burchett explained to Appellant that she had just gotten divorced 
and didn't want to seem like a tramp, and therefore she didn't 
want to have sex with him (T. 167). 
Before May 24, 1991, Burchett had told Appellant that 
she was a cocaine user (T. 123) , and on that date she went to the 
bar around 6:00 p.m. (T. 66). Later in the evening, Appellant, 
using a gesture Burchett understood to mean cocaine, said, "Do 
you want some?" (T. 67). Agent Burchett said, "Yeah" (T. 68), 
and Appellant handed her a folded dollar bill, which she took to 
the bathroom. There, she unfolded the bill, removed a part of the 
small quantity of cocaine therein, secured the sample and returned 
the bill to Appellant (T. 68). Later that evening, Appellant, 
having been informed by Burchett that she hadn't used all of the 
cocaine he gave her earlier, again handed her the bill. She again 
went to the bathroom, removed the rest of the small quantity of 
cocaine, and returned the empty bill to Appellant (T. 69). 
During the months of May and June, 1991, Burchett and 
Appellant continued their relationshipf She visited him often at 
the bar where he worked (T. 74), frequently taking him home-cooked 
dinners while he was working (T. 94). On at least one occasion 
she invited him to her home for dinner (T.93). Appellant and his 
brother went to her home to fix her porch and mow her lawn, and 
she thanked him by sending him flowers (T. 94). He sometimes 
drove her car and his brother drove her truck (T. 99). She tes-
tified at trial that she was cultivating her friendship with Ap-
pellant in order to get him to give her drugs (T. 114). She 
even cultivated a friendship with Appellant's mother, accompanying 
her to a movie (T. 111) and taking her a home-cooked dinner at her 
place of work once or twice (T. 94). 
Some time during the month of June, 1991, Appellant 
visited Burchett at Brian Head, where she worked as a cocktail 
waitress (T.73). Before she finished work, she invited Appellant 
to stay with her that night in a hotel room of Jeff 5*arr, a friend 
of hers who also worked at Brian Head (T. 95). Appellant took a 
friend home, then went to Burchett's hotel room, where she greeted 
him at the door wearing only a long shirt and panties (T. 97). They 
again slept the night in the same bed, although they did not engage 
in sexual intercourse (T. 73). 
On June 20, 1991 Burchett was again visiting Appellant 
at the bar where he was working (T. 74) when he again offered her 
a small dose of cocaine. She took the cocaine to the restroom and 
removed a small sample (T. 75), later turning it in as evidence. 
After this second incident, Appellant heard little from 
Burchett (T. 165) until August 28, 1992, when she phoned him at 
his work, saying they "had to talk" (T. 162). By this time Appel-
lant had learned that Burchett was a police officer (T. 162), but 
agreed to meet her at his work the following day. She never came. 
II. The Disputed Trial Testimony 
On cross-examination, Agent Burchett testified that 
she never used illegal drugs while working undercover in Iron 
County (T. 102). The defense produced a witness, Jeff Farr, who 
was prepared to testify that Burchett used illegal drugs on several 
occasions during the time she was working undercover for the Iron/ 
Beaver County Narcotics Task Force (T. 149) . Although the prose-
cutor did not object to this testimony (T. 150) , the trial judge 
ruled sua sponte that the proferred testimony of Jeff Farr was 
prohibited by Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 150). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The conduct of Officer Anne Burchett induced the 
Appellant to give her drugs, and was entrapment within the meaning 
of §76-2-303(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as enacted by Laws, 
1973. The evidence establishes as a matter of law that Anne Bur-
chett induced the commission of the offenses by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offenses would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit them. The trial court erred in denying 
Appellant's motion to dismiss both counts on the ground that he was 
entrapped. Reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence should 
necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt on 
Count II of the Information, and the jury's verdict should be 
overturned. 
2. The trial judge incorrectly excluded the testimony 
of defense witness Jeff Farr under Rule 608 (b). His testimony was 
admissible as impeachment of Agent Anne Burchett, and was material 
to the central issue of the propriety of the agentfs conduct. The 
exclusion of Farr's testimony was a denial of Appellant's right to 
due process and to present witnesses in his defense, in violation 
of Utah Const, art. I, §7 and §12. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE POLICE CONDUCT INDUCING APPELLANT TO DISTRIBUTE 
DRUGS TO AGENT ANNE BURCHETT WAS ENTRAPMENT. 
The defense of entrapment set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-303(1) (1977) embodies an objective standard, focusing the 
inquiry on the conduct of the police: 
"Under the objective view of entrapment, 
the focus is not on the propensities 
and predisposition of the specific de-
fendant, but on whether the police con-
duct falls below standards to which 
common feelings respond, for the pro-
per use of government power. This con-
cept establishes entrapment on its his-
torical basis, the refusal to counte-
nance a perversion of justice by go-
vernmental misconduct. The objective 
view provides a solid definitive 
standard upon which the defense can 
rest, i.e., does the conduct of the 
government comport with a fair and 
honorable administration of justice?" 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1979) at 500. 
In each case the propriety of the inducement by the 
police is measured by its probable effect on a hypothetical per-
son in the setting in which the inducement took place. State v. 
Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987). Every case in which the 
defense is raised must be carefully examined on its own facts, 
State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), and the Utah Su-
preme Court has suggested that the very circumstances in this case 
may go beyond the proper use of the government's power: 
"Extreme pleas of desperate illness or 
appeal based primarily on sympathy, 
pity, or close personal friendship, or 
offers of inordinate sums of money, 
are examples, depending on an evaluation 
of the circumstances in each case, of 
what might constitute prohibited po-
lice conduct. In evaluating the course 
of conduct between the government re-
presentative and the defendant, the 
transactions leading up to the offense, 
the interaction between the agent and 
the defendant, and the response to the 
inducements of the agent, are all to 
be considered in judging what the ef-
fect of the government agent's conduct 
would be on a normal person. Taylor, 
599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). 
Although the prosecutor made much of the fact that 
Anne Burchett never actually asked Appellant for the cocaine 
(T. 175) , claiming that she therefore never induced him to com-
mit the offensesf it is clear from the facts that her entire 
course of conduct toward Appellant induced him to give her the 
drugs. Indeed, her stated purpose was to cultivate her friend-
ship with him to get him to give her drugs (T. 114) . And this 
relationship went far beyond ordinary friendship; by her own 
description Anne Burchett and Appellant were dating (T. 63), and 
were not dating other people (T. 100, 163). By the time Appellant 
first gave her cocaine on May 24, 1991, he and Burchett had gone 
to dinner at a restaurant, ridden together on his motorcycle, 
seen a movie and gone to lunch together (T. 63). She had visited 
him several times at his place of work (T. 155) , and had gone 
with him to a party at Panguitch Lake, where they, along with 
others, played strip poker. They slept together alone in the 
same bed (T. 64), and he had kissed her. She had told him she 
was a cocaine user (T. 123) , and she had identified him as a 
"target" for drugs (T. 88). This conduct on Burchett's part 
was specifically intended by her to induce Appellant to give her 
drugs, and it was successful. 
Even though the evidence in this case does not involve 
the intimate sexual relationships dealt with in State v. Taylor, 
599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979) and State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 
1975) , the relationship between Burchett and Appellant was signi-
ficantly more intimate than the one disapproved in State v. Kaufman, 
734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987). In holding that the defendant had been 
entrapped by the actions of an attractive female police officer, 
the Kaufman court observed: 
"Clearly, the defendant saw more in her 
than a business relationship. Why didn't 
the police send in a male officer? Or 
an unattractive female police officer? 
The answer is clear from the relationship 
which developed." 734 P.2d at 468. 
In the Kaufman case the mere expectation by the defendant that 
his relationship with the female officer might become more inti-
mate was deemed significant by the court in ruling that the of-
ficer had entrapped him; in the case now before this Court the 
defendant's expectations had gone nearly to the ultimate fruition 
of complete sexual intimacy. 
This case must be distinguished from State v. Wynia, 
754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), in which two undercover female 
officers had only two contacts with the defendant, each occasion 
resulting in the defendant's sale of drugs to the agents. These 
meetings were in a public bowling alley/lounge and in a second 
lounge, and, except for an agent buying the defendant drinks, no-
thing else other than the drug transactions ever took place be-
tween the agents and the defendant. This Court found no entrapment, 
ruling that the police conduct was consistent with the fair and 
honorable administration of justice. 754 P.2d at 670. Appellant's 
relationship with Anne Burchett, however, had progressed far be-
yond the superficial contacts approved in Wynia. By the time 
the first drug transaction took place, the two had spent many hours 
alone together in an unmistakably romantic liason. 
In this case the State has suggested that because Bur-
chett never had sexual intercourse with Appellant, her conduct 
cannot be condemned (T. 176, 191)f emphasizing the necessity for 
an undercover agent to gain the confidence of a potential offender. 
But the agent's conduct in this case went far beyond gaining Ap-
pellant's confidence. The social aspects of the relationship are 
at the core of the entrapment defense, and the State cannot dis-
tance itself from the consequences of Burchett's behavior: 
"The government, once employing an 
undercover agent, cannot choose to 
select those actions of the infor-
mer which are beneficial to its 
case, and refuse to be responsible 
for the total conduct of its agent 
while engaged in the deception." 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 751 
(Utah 1975) (Maughan, J. dissenting) 
(emphasis added)• 
It is notable that the views of Justice Maughan dissenting in 
Curtis became the law of this state in the Supreme Court's next 
entrapment decision, State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). 
Anne Burchett's total conduct falls far below the 
"proper use of governmental power," Sherman v. United States, 356 
U.S. 369, 382 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). She clearly 
"capitalized on a special relationship," State v. Wright, 744 P. 
2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987), appealing to the intimate friendship 
she had established with the Appellant. Such police behavior 
must not be tolerated in an advanced society. Taylor, supra, 
at 502. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS JEFF FARR. 
I. Statutory and Decisional Law 
The trial judge, without any prosecution objection 
to the testimony of defense witness Jeff Farr, ruled that his tes-
timony was inadmissible as a "specific instance of the conduct" of 
agent Anne Burchett and therefore unprovable by extrinsic evidence 
according to the prohibition of Utah Rule of Evidence 608 (b). 
Since the witness Anne Burchett had denied in her trial testi-
mony that she had used illegal drugs during the time she was in-
vestigating Appellant's cases, Jeff Farr's proferred testimony 
that he had personally observed Burchett to use illegal drugs du-
ring that time was a direct impeachment of Burchett. Even if 
his testimony was otherwise prohibited by Rule 608(b), it was 
nonetheless admissible impeachment: 
"In accordance with Rule 608, Utah 
courts have consistently held that 
impeachment evidence is admissible 
if it goes to credibility, even 
though it introduces evidence which 
would otherwise be inadmissible." 
State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In Reed, the defendant had testified that he had told a witness 
that he did not use drugs. This Court approved the prosecutor's 
subsequent inquiry of both the defendant and a third witness 
about drug paraphernalia found at the defendant's housef obser-
ving that credibility was a crucial issue; first, the defendant's 
testimony had directly attacked the character of another witness. 
Second, the defendant's testimony directly contradicted that of 
another witness. Third, the defendant had denied the use of drugs, 
and this Court ruled that inquiring into the presence of drug pa-
raphernalia in his house was permissible impeachment. 820 P.2d 
at 481. 
This case is factually identical to Reed. Burchett had 
testified that she did not use illegal drugs during her undercover 
assignment, and Farr's testimony had a direct bearing on her cre-
dibility on that point. In addition, in this case, the entire 
behavior of the police was the only issue before the jury, and 
Farr's testimony was monumentally important to that inquiry. 
His evidence was clearly more than the general attack on credi-
bility prohibited by Rule 608(b), State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 
200 (Utah 1987) , and was improperly excluded by the trial judge. 
The error affected the substantial right of Appellant to present 
his defense of entrapment, the only defense he offered, and was 
therefore reversible, Utah R. Evid. 103(a), a proffer of the sub-
stance of Farr's testimony having been made on the trial record 
(T. 149). 
II. Constitutional Basis 
The trial court's exclusion of the testimony of defense 
witness Jeff Farr prevented Appellant from presenting his only 
witness other than himself. Farr's testimony had a direct bearing 
on the credibility of the undercover agent as well as upon the 
propriety of the police conduct in this case, the very issue raised 
by Appellant's entrapment defense. Appellant was thus deprived of 
his fundamental right to present a witness in his defense, and 
the deprivation was of constitutional dimensions. Although the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the violation of an evidentiary 
standard is not in every case a constitutional deprivation, State 
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987), this Court is urged 
so to hold in this case. 
A. Due Process 
An early Utah case dealing with Art. I, §7 of our 
state Constitution observed: 
"Many attempts have been made to further 
define 'due process' but they all re-
solve into the thought that a party 
shall have his day in court — that is 
each party shall have the right to a 
hearing before a competent court, with 
the privilege of being heard and intro-
ducing evidence to establish his cause 
or defense, after which comes judgment 
upon the record thus made." Christiansen 
v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945). 
In the circumstances of this case the language of Christiansen 
is directly pertinent. Because Jeff Farr was the only defense 
witness other than the Appellant himself and hostile police of-
ficers, and because his testimony had a direct bearing on the 
credibility of the state's principal witness and upon the pro-
priety of the conduct of the police, his exclusion prevented 
Appellant from having his "day in court," and denied him the 
"privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish" 
his defense. The error in excluding Farr's testimony was there-
fore a denial of Appellant's right to due process guaranteed by 
Utah Const, art. I, §7. 
B. Right to Present Witnesses 
The language of Utah Const, art. I, §12 includes the 
right of the accused "to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf . . . " Implicit in 
this language is the right to present the testimony of such 
witnesses at trial. No Utah case has dealt with this construction 
of our Constitution, but the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has 
recognized the right of a defendant to present witnesses in his 
defense as being anchored in a Maryland Constitutional provision 
similar to ours. In Brooks v. State, 560 A.2d 56 (Md. App. 1989), 
the court held that the trial court's erroneous exclusion of a 
defense witness who would have testified in a DUI case that the 
defendant was not driving the car amounted to a violation of the 
defendant's right under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights to "present witnesses in his defense." 560 A.2d at 59. 
Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights 
guarantees criminal defendants the right "to have process for his 
witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath 
. . . " The identical right to present witnesses is inherent in 
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution. This Court should hold 
that this right cannot be abrogated by a statutory rule of evidence 
nor by the erroneous application of such a rule as occurred here. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant was entrapped into commission of the 
offenses for which he was charged, and this Court should hold 
that, as a matter of law, the trial court's denial of his mo-
tion to dismiss both counts was reversible error. The jury's 
verdict of guilty should be reversed as to Count II of the In-
formation, because reasonable minds must have a reasonable doubt 
that Appellant was not entrapped. If this Court does not reverse 
on the entrapment issue it should hold that the exclusion of the 
testimony of defense witness Jeff Farr was error affecting the 
substantial right of Appellant to present his defense, both as a 
matter of statutory construction, as well as under the Constitution 
of the State of Utahf and remand the case for a new trial. 
I hereby certify that on November 19, 1992, I delivered 
four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Utah 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake 5<fty, Utah 
84114. 
